Rethinking the Emerging Jurisprudence of Juvenile Death by Bassham, Gregory
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 5
Issue 2 Symposium on Serious Juvenile Crime Article 10
February 2014
Rethinking the Emerging Jurisprudence of Juvenile
Death
Gregory Bassham
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gregory Bassham, Rethinking the Emerging Jurisprudence of Juvenile Death, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 467 (1991).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol5/iss2/10
STUDENT ARTICLE
R19IHINKING THE EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE
OF JUVENILE DEATH
GREGORY BAssHw*
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution,
made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment,' prohibits the infliction of "cruel and
unusual punishments."' Since early in this century,' one of the
settled principles of eighth amendment jurisprudence has been
that the amendment proscribes punishments that are "grossly
out of proportion to the severity" 4 of an offender's crime. In
several recent Supreme Court decisions, this traditional princi-
ple of proportionality has come under attack by High Court
conservatives, led by Justice Antonin Scalia.5 Given the com-
parative youthfulness of the conservative insurgents and the
realities of contemporary politics, it seems likely that Scalia's
reading of the amendment will soon command a majority on
* Doctoral candidate in Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, and
Editorial Assistant, Thos. J. White Center on Law & Government, Notre
Dame Law School. My thanks to John Robinson for helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article.
1. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). One of the most
contested issues in constitutional history has been whether those who framed
and ratified the fourteenth amendment intended it to "incorporate," i.e. make
applicable to the states, some or all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
For detailed discussions of the competing views, see M. CURTIS, No STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1986); H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
IN THE UNITED STATES 28-117 (5th ed. 1988).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In full, the amendment reads: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."
3. See infra pp. 3-5 and accompanying notes.
4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
5. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 873 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2963-69 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct.
2969, 2977-80 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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the Court. In this Note, I defend the established eighth amend-
ment doctrine against its conservative detractors.
I begin (in Part I) with a brief overview of the Supreme
Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence from the adoption of
the Bill of Rights (1791) to the end of the Burger Court (1986).
In Part II, I examine the emerging conservative challenge to
the Court's traditional reading of the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause-a challenge first issued injustice Scalia's dissent
in Thompson v. Oklahoma and reasserted the following Term in
Scalia-authored opinions in Stanford v. Kentucky 7 and Penry v.
Lynaugh.8 In Part III, I provide a general defense of the tradi-
tional principles of eighth amendment jurisprudence against
Scalia's animadversions. I conclude (in Part IV) by focusing on
one area of eighth amendment law where the case for retaining
the traditional approach is particularly compelling-that of
juvenile capital punishment.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S EVOLVING EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
The text of the eighth amendment was copied, almost ver-
batim, from a provision of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
(1776), which in turn was derived from the English Bill of
Rights (1689). 9 Historians are in general agreement that the
framers of the amendment originally understood it to prohibit
only barbarous and torturous punishments of the sort that had
been common in Tudor and Stuart England.' 0 The framers
clearly did not believe that such then-common punishments as
lashing, branding, earcropping, or execution by hanging or fir-
ing squad were cruel and unusual." Nor did they believe that
the eighth amendment prohibited disproportionately severe
6. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
7. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
8. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
9. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238, 319 (Marshal, J., concurring).
10. See, e.g., Grannuci, "Nor Cnel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 860-65 (1969); R. BERGER, DEATH
PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COUNT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 174 (1982). These
punishments included, for capital offenses, burning at the stake, boiling in
oil, burial alive, drowning, death by pressing, and disembowelment followed
by beheading and quartering. For noncapital offenses, various forms of
bodily mutilation were common. See 1 J.F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 476-78; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 369-
72; W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALrrY OF THE
DEATH PENALTY 16 (1979).
11. See Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evoling Standards for the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1031 (1978); L.
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punishments so long as those punishments were neither bar-
baric nor torturous.
The earliest Supreme Court cases involving thE amend-
ment, decided in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
tended to reflect this original understanding of the clause.1s
But in Weems v. United States ' 4 the Court "decisively repudiated
the 'historical' interpretation of the Clause.""' In memorable
language Justice McKenna, speaking for the Court, explained
this departure from the received reading of the amendment:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted,
it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general lan-
guage should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to
the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and pur-
poses. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable
of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occa-
sions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly as
human institutions can approach it." The future is their
care and provisions for events of good and bad tenden-
cies of which no prophecy can be made. In the applica-
tion of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.' 6
A half-century later, in Trop v. Duile ,' 7 the Court reaf-
firmed this expansive reading of the clause. Speaking for him-
BERKSON, THE CONCEPr OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 55 (1975); R.
BERGER. supra note 10, at 118 n.29.
12. See Grannuci, supra note 10, at 860-65. But see O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323, 339-41 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); Comment, The Eighth
Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for Weems V.
United States' Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783 (1975).
13. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (upholding
execution by firing squad); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding
execution by electrocution). Cf. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
455 (1867); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); Howard v. Fleming, 191
U.S. 126 (1903).
14. 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (striking down sentence of a Philippine court
of fifteen years' imprisonment at hard labor in chains, followed by perpetual
surveillance and other permanent civil disabilities, for the crime of falsifying
public documents).
15. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 266 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
16. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
17. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (invalidating sentence of denaturalization for
the crime of wartime desertion).
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self and three other members of the Court, Chief Justice
Warren declared that "[t]he basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."'"
Echoing Weems' conclusion that the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes more enlightened,"' 9 War-
ren added that the clause "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."20
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,2' the Court for the first time
squarely addressed the issue of whether the death penalty per se
is cruel and unusual punishment. The result has aptly been
termed a "jurisprudential debacle."'22 In an unprecedentedly
lengthy and fractured 5-4 decision, the Court held that "as a
result of giving the sentencers unguided discretion to impose
or not to impose the death penalty for murder, the penalty was
being imposed discriminatorily, wantonly and freakishly and so
infrequently that any given death sentence was cruel and unu-
sual."' 2s There was no majority or plurality opinion, but rather
a brief per curiam opinion followed by five separate concur-
rences and four dissents. Justices Marshall and Brennan each
concluded that the eighth amendment prohibits capital punish-
ment under any circumstances. 24 Justices Stewart, White, and
Douglas refused to go so far, but did find that the death penalty
as then administered in some forty-odd state and federal juris-
dictions 25 was being imposed so infrequently and arbitrarily as
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.26 The four dis-
senters-Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Jus-
18. Id. at 100.
19. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
20. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962) (striking down statute that criminalized narcotics addiction per se as
inconsistent with "contemporary human knowledge" about drug
dependency).
21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22. Radin, supra note 11, at 998.
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 220-21 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring). This is a retrospective view of Furman's holding; in the years
intervening between Furman and Gregg there was considerable uncertainty
among legislators, courts, and commentators over just how Furman should be
read. See Radin, supra note 11, at 998 n.33.
24. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring); id at 257-
306 (Brennan, J., concurring).
25. See id at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
26. See id at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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tice Burger 2 7-while agreeing that the eighth amendment "may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
human justice,"" argued that the petitioners had failed to
prove "that capital punishment offends the conscience of soci-
ety to such a degree that [the Court's] traditional deference"2 9
to the judgment of the representative branches of government
should be abandoned.
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,s° the Court upheld a
Georgia capital murder statute designed to guide but not com-
pletely eliminate sentencing discretion. The Court's 7-2 major-
ity was split three ways. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Powell and Stevens, announced the plurality opinion and the
judgment of the Court."' Justice White, joined by Justice
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, filed an opinion concur-
ring in the judgment.3 2 Justice Blackmun concurred in the
judgment but did not join or author an opinion." The two
dissenters, Justices Brennan and Marshall, continued to insist,
as they regularly have in subsequent death penalty cases,34 that
capital punishment is invariably cruel and unusual
punishment.35
In later decisions, largely by cutting and pasting from the
various opinions in Furman and Gregg, the Court developed a
consistent analytical framework for deciding eighth amend-
ment issues that remains, apparendy,3s good law today.3 7
27. See id at 375-405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 405-14
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id at 414-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); id at 465-70
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 383 (Burger, CJ., joined by Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist, _J, dissenting) (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 378).
29. Id. at 385 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
30. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
31. Id. at 153-207 (opinion of Stewart, Stevens, and Powell, JJ.).
32. Id. at 207-26 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
33. See id at 227 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
34. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305-06 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring); id at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 600-01
(Marshall, J., concurring); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782. 801
(1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); i at 231-41
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
36. Parts 1-3(b) of the traditional test, infra pp. 9-10, were reaffirmed by
a majority of the Court as recently as Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969
(1989). See id at 2981-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); id at 2982-94 (Brennan, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting). The current status of Part 3(c) of the test is
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According to that framework, the basic value affirmed and pro-
tected by the eighth amendment is the value of human dig-
nity."s Any punishment that fails to comport with basic human
dignity is, as such, cruel and unusual, and will be struck down
regardless of how widely accepted or practiced that mode of
punishment may be.39 In determining whether a particular
punishment is fundamentally inconsistent with the dignity of
man, and hence a violation of the eighth amendment, the Court
has traditionally employed a three-part test. According to that
test, a punishment is unconstitutional if
(1) it is a form of punishment originally understood
by the framers to be cruel and unusual;'
(2) a demonstrable societal consensus exists that
the punishment offends civilized standards of decency;4
or
uncertain following the Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987) (upholding death sentence of a black petitioner despite strong
evidence he was sentenced under a procedure that involved a substantial risk
of arbitrary and racially discriminatory decisions). See generaily id at 299-320;
id at 322-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-47 (1981); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
788, 798-801 (1982); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-92 (1983); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1986); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
299-303 (1987); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2959 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Stevens, and
Powell,JJ.); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
39. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 376 (Burger CJ., dissenting) ("Although
the Eighth Amendment literally reads as prohibiting only those punishments
that are both 'cruel' and 'unusual,' history compels the conclusion that the
Constitution prohibits all punishments of extreme and barbarous cruelty
regardless of how frequently or infrequently imposed"). For a different view
of the intended meaning of the amendment, see R. BERGER, supra note 10, at
41 (arguing that the amendment should be read literally as barring only those
punishments that are both cruel and unusual, and that the framers understood
the word "unusual" in its ordinary sense, as "signifying something different
from that which is ordinarily done" (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958))).
40. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934,
2953 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2974 (1989).
41. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269-70 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring); id.
at 329 (Marshall, J., concurring); id at 383 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at
242 (Douglas, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
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(3) the punishment is (a) "grossly out of propor-
tion to the severity of the crime; "42 (b) "makes no mea-
surable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering;"-4 3 or (c)
"imposed under sentencing procedures that create a sub-
stantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner." '44
It is Part (3) of this traditional three-part test that has
recently come under fire by High Court conservatives. To that
attack we now turn.
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102 (1976); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 821 (1988) (plurality opinion); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953
(1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2974 (1989).
In assessing whether a particular punishment is inconsistent with
contemporary standards of decency, the Court has repeatedly emphasized
that its judgments "should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective
views of individual Justices." Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(plurality opinion); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2975
(1989). To avoid this risk, the Court has relied heavily on objective indicia of
public attitudes toward challenged forms of punishment, most notably
legislative enactments and the decisions of sentencing juries. See, e.g., Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92
(1983); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109
S. Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989).
42. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,JJ.).
See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 685 (1978); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982); Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969,
2987 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id at 2981-82 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
43. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,JJ.).
See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 458, 592 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 798 (1982); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 (1988)
(plurality opinion); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2955 (1989) (opinion
of O'Connor, J.); Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2993 (1989)(Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 391-96
(1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (criticizing this prong of the traditional test).
44. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (plurality opinion).
See also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.);
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 343 (1985); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 322-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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II. THE EMERGING CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGE TO
TRADMONAL EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The proposition that the eighth amendment prohibits pun-
ishments that are grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the
crime committed has been the centerpiece of eighth amend-
ment jurisprudence for eighty years. Many of the Court's lead-
ing eighth amendment decisions from Weems 45 to Ford4 rely
explicitly upon this principle of proportionality, 4 as do scores
of lower court cases.48 So firmly rooted has the principle
become that from 1910 to the advent of the Rehnquist Court
(1986) not a single Justice appears to have rejected it.49 It thus
came as a surprise to many observers when, in 1988, two con-
servative members of the Court, Justice White and ChiefJustice
Rehnquist, joined a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia, urging
the Court to scrap the whole third part of the traditional eighth
amendment analysis, including the principle of proportional-
ity.' This surprise turned to dismay for many commentators
the following Term when justice Kennedy added his vote to the
call for a dramatic revision of traditional eighth amendment
doctrine.5
The opening salvo of this conservative critique was fired in
Thompson v. Ohlahoma.52 At issue there was whether the Consti-
tution prohibits the execution of a person who was under six-
teen years of age at the time of his or her offense. Applying the
standard eighth amendment analysis, four members of the
Court, Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
concluded that the execution of such individuals does consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment, since it both (a) is inconsis-
45. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 371-74.
46. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
47. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. den'd, Cranke v. Haygood, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); Williams v. Johnson,
845 F.2d 906, 909 (1 1th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134, 138 (2d
Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Cook, 859 F.2d 777, 778 (9th Cir. 1988).
49. Court conservatives have consistently argued, however, that
successful proportionality challenges in noncapital sentencing decisions
should be "exceedingly rare." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
Cf. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam) (upholding sentence of
forty years' imprisonment and fine of $20,000 for possession of nine ounces
of marijuana); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 311 n.3 (1983) (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting).
50. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859-78"(Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. See Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977-80 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Penry, 109
S. Ct. at 2963-69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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tent with contemporary standards of decency, and (b) fails to
contribute measurably to either of the two social purposes that
purportedly are served by the death penalty, namely retribu-
tion and deterrence.'- Justice O'Connor, concurring in the
judgment and also accepting the traditional analysis, found the
plurality's argument for (a) plausible but not conclusive and its
argument for (b) unconvincing.' Preferring to decide the case
on narrower grounds than that adopted by the plurality, she
held that states may not execute persons under age sixteen at
the time of their offense under capital punishment statutes that
fail to specify no minimum age at which commission of a capital
crime may lead to the offender's execution. 55 Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice White and ChiefJustice Rehnquist, filed a dis-
senting opinion, arguing that the eighth amendment prohibits
only those punishments that offend either Parts (1) or (2) of the
traditional analysis. 5' Finding that "the evidence is unusually
clear and unequivocal" that the eighth amendment was not
"originally understood to prohibit capital punishment for
crimes committed by persons under the age of sixteen,"5 7 and
that there is no clear indication that society now finds such
punishment morally unacceptable, 8 the dissent concluded that
the eighth amendment does not prohibit the execution of per-
sons, like the defendant, who committed crimes when they
were fifteen years old. The Court's ninth member, Justice Ken-
nedy, had only recently joined the Court, and took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
The following Term, in Stanford v. Kentucky,59 the Court
held that the eighth amendment does not categorically prohibit
capital punishment for crimes committed by persons aged six-
teen or seventeen. Once again the Court was sharply divided,
withJustice O'Connor providing the swing vote. Five members
of the Court, Justices Scalia, White, Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded that the execution of such
persons is not barred by either the original understanding of
the eighth amendment or by contemporary standards of
decency.' Four of these Justices (excluding Justice O'Connor)
further concluded that a punishment is proscribed by the
53. See id at 815-38 (plurality opinion).
54. See id at 848-55.
55. See id at 856-59.
56. See id at 859-78.
57. Id. at 864.
58. See id. at 865-72.
59. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
60. See id at 2974-77.
19911
476 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW. ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
eighth amendment only if it fails either or both of these two
tests.8 At this Justice O'Connor balked. In a brief opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, she argued
that the eighth amendment also imposes on the Court a consti-
tutional duty to determine whether "the 'nexus between the
punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness' is
proportional. "W Since, however, she disagreed with the dis-
sent's conclusion8 that capital punishment for crimes commit-
ted by persons under age eighteen is invariably
disproportionate, Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment
of the Court.'
In Penty v. Lynaugh,65 decided the same day as Stanford, a
similarly divided Court held that the eighth amendment does
not categorically prohibit the execution of capital murderers
who are mildly to moderately mentally retarded. In this case,
except for a brief concluding section (Part IV-C), Justice
O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In Part IV-C,
which no other Justice joined, Justice O'Connor defended the
traditional three-part test of eighth amendment claims, but
concluded that no part of that test bars the imposition of the
death penalty on retarded defendants possessed of the peti-
tioner's powers of reasoning and self-control." In an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, also defended the traditional test,
and argued that executing the mentally retarded is prohibited
by both Parts (2) and (3) of that test.6 Justice Stevens, in an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part and joined by
Justice Blackmun, reached a similar conclusion.6 Justice
Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White and Ken-
nedy, also filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which he reiterated his view that the cruel and unusual
punishments clause prohibits only those punishments that
either violate the original understanding or are contrary to
evolving standards of decency.69
61. See id at 2977-80.
62. ld at 2981 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
63. See id at 2987-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,
Stevens, and Blackmun, J.).
64. See id at 2982.
65. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
66. See id at 2955-58.
67. See id at 2958-63.
68. See id at 2963.
69. See id. at 2964.
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As the foregoing makes clear, justice Scalia's reading of
the eighth amendment marks a significant departure from long-
standing and controlling precedent. Now it is a legal common-
place that in constitutional law, as in law generally, the
principle of stare decisis serves a number of important values. It
promotes the value of liberty by helping to ensure that "gov-
ernment in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and
announced beforehand."7 It promotes the value of fairness-by
respecting the requirement of formal justice that like cases be
treated alike. It furthers the values of stability and certainty by
enabling individuals to rely on past decisions and to make
choices and commit resources based on these expectations.
Finally, it promotes the value of efficiency by discouraging the
continual relitigation of legal issues and freeing judges from
the necessity of continually rethinking such issues de novo."
This is not to say, of course, that the Court should treat the
principle of stare decisis as an inflexible command. Because cor-
rection through legislative action or constitutional amendment
is practically impossible when the Court adopts a mistaken con-
struction of the Constitution,7 a rigid adherence to prior deci-
sions would mean that many mistaken rulings would become
permanent deformations of constitutional law. Nevertheless,
the values underlying the principle of stare decisis do establish a
presumption in favor of retaining established interpretations.
Moreover, this presumption is considerably strengthened
when, as is true of the principle of proportionality, a prior
interpretation is both long-established and firmly embedded in
the law and life of the nation."s Thus, the Court should accept
70. F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944).
71. For an extended discussion of the virtues of precedential
constraint, see Schauer, Precedent, 39 STA. L. REV. 571, 595-602 (1987). See
also Moore, A Natural Law Theory of interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 371-
77 (1985); Moragne v. State Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970); C.I.R. v.
Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 101-06 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). For this reason, the Court has often declared that
the doctrine of stare decisis has a more limited application in constitutional law
than in other areas of law. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671
(1974); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272-73 n.18
(1980) (plurality opinion); C.I.R. v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 104-05 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See, e.g., Gathers v. South Carolina, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The respect accorded prior decisions increases,
rather than decreases, with their antiquity, as society adjusts itself to their
existence, and the surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity").
See also R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAw 158-59 (1990).
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Justice Scalia's call for a sweeping revision of established eighth
amendment doctrine only if that call is supported by compel-
ling arguments.
In fact,Justice Scalia's case for his bold new reading is any-
thing but compelling. He offers two arguments for his view,
each surprisingly brief and undeveloped. The first argument
focuses on language of the eighth amendment-the fact that it
bars "cruel and unusual punishments." The second argument is
a stock -conservative alarum against the hazards of replacing
"judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings." 74 I
shall take up these arguments in turn.
A. Scalia's Textualist Argument
Justice Scalia's first argument consists of a single sentence:
"On its face, the phrase 'cruel and unusual punishments' limits
the evolving standards appropriate for our consideration to
those entertained by the society rather than those dictated by
our personal consciences." 5 Elsewhere in his opinion he adds:
a "punishment is either 'cruel and unusual' (i.e., society has set
its face against it) or it is not." 76
This second assertion, like all tautologies, seems pretty
unassailable. But what are we to make of the first claim? Those
familiar with Justice Scalia's jurisprudence will recognize at
once that it flows from his strong commitment to textual-
ism77-the doctrine that judges, in interpreting legal texts,
should stick close to the "plain" or literal meanings of those
texts."' This is a view of legal interpretation that, in constitu-
tional law at least, the Court has consistently rejected for at
least five decades79 and probably longer.80 But what is puz-
74. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
75. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 873 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979.
77. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1831-34
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); I.N.S. v.
Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 451 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171-76 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
78. For related but somewhat different uses of "textualism," see P.
BoBIrrr, CONSTrUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CoNsTrnrmoN 25-38 (1982);
M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRrnCAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 60 (1988); Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64
CHI.-KErr L. REV. 211, 211 (1988). For a helpful general discussion, see
Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990).
79. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Association, 310 U.S.
534, 545 (1940) (rejecting the so-called "Plain Meaning Rule," according to
which courts were permitted to consult extra-textual evidence of original
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zling here is that in this case the "plain" language of the
amendment clearly does not support Scalia's reading. "Oh its
face," what the amendment prohibits are punishments that are
"cruel," i.e. really cruel, not merely conventionally believed to
be such, "and unusual," i.e. rarely if ever imposed. By no stretch
does the "plain meaning" of the text require judges to uphold
punishments that are both grossly disproportionate and
imposed on a tiny fraction of otherwise indistinguishable
offenders.
To be sure, the literal language of the amendment does
appear to support one of Scalia's claims: that the amendment
applies only to punishments that are not commonly imposed."'
We noted earlier that it is disputed whether this literal sense
accords with the original understanding of the amendment.
8 2
This should at least give Scalia pause, since he professes to
view the original "meaning" (public understanding) of consti-
tutional language as binding.85 Of more significance is the fact
that the Court has consistently rejected the view that the Con-
stitution should be interpreted with the sort of strict literalness
often thought appropriate to other kinds of legal instru-
ments.8 Thus, the seemingly absolute language of the first
legislative or framers' intent only in cases in which the meaning of the text at
issue was not "plain"). Cf Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 789 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("As its
prior cases clearly show .... this Court does not subscribe to the simplistic
view that constitutional interpretation can possibly be limited to the 'plain
meaning' of the Constitution's text").
80. See generally L. LEw, ORIGINAL. INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'
CONSTITUTION 336-38 (1988).
81. In fact, of course, Scalia wants (and needs) an even stronger
conclusion: that the amendment applies only to punishments that are not
widely authorized (even if seldomly imposed). In other words, Scalia wants to
read the word "unusual" in the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" to
mean "authorized in few if any jurisdictions," not "seldomly if ever imposed
on eligible offenders." The execution of persons under age eighteen is
unusual in the second sense but not in the first. See generally V. STREIB, DEATH
PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 24-30 (1987). As a matter of ordinary usage, Scalia's
reading is possible but less intuitive than the alternative sense.
82. See supra note 39.
83. See Scalia, Originalism: TheLesserEvil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941) ("[W]e
read (the Constitution's] words, not as we read legislative codes which are
subject to continuous revision with the changing course of events, but as the
revelation of great purposes which were intended to be achieved by the
Constitution as a continuing instrument of government"); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 789
(1986) ("mhe Constitution is not a deed setting forth the precise metes and
bounds of its subject matter, rather, it is a document announcing
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amendment,"5 declaring inter alia that Congress shall make "no
law" prohibiting the free exercise of religion or abridging free-
dom of speech and press, has never been read as a categorical
prohibition.86 The constitutional mandate that the "trial of all
Crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury" ' has
been held not to apply to petty,88 juvenile,89 or military
crimes," or to prohibit defendants from waiving their right to a
jury trial.9 ' The privileges and immunities clause, providing
that the "citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States,"9 has not
been interpreted as barring all preferential treatment, however
reasonable or minor, by a state of its own citizens over citizens
of other states.93 The presentment clause, providing that
"[e]very order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary...
shall be presented to the President of the United States,"' 4 has
not been read to require that every vote taken prior to the pas-
sage of legislation, or every resolution not intended to have the
fundamental principles in value-laden terms that leave ample scope for the
exercise of normative judgment by those charged with interpreting and
applying it") (White, J., dissenting). See also Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934).
85. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
86. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding
application of a federal anti-polygamy law to a Mormon whose religious
convictions obliged him to engage in that practice); Employment Division v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (holding that the free exercise clause permits
states to prohibit sacramental peyote use and thus deny unemployment
benefits to persons discharged for such use); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 568 (1942) (noting that there are various "well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech," such as perjury, obscenity, and
incitement, "the prevention of which [has] never [been] thought to raise any
Constitutional problem").
87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
88. See generally U.S. v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 740-53 (1964) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting).
89. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
90. See, e.g., Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S..(4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866).
91. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
92. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (emphasis added).
93. See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3230)
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823); Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371, 387 (1978).
94. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
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force of law, be submitted to the President, as the clause seems
literally to require.9"And so on for many other provisions.9
What these examples show is that the Court has often-
and rightly-refused to construe the Constitution with mechan-
ical literalness. The cruel and unusual punishments clause is
one of many provisions which the Court has declined to inter-
pret literally, believing that to do so would be inconsistent with
the framers' intentions and the broader purposes they sought
to achieve. 97 To point out, as Justice Scalia does, that one ele-
ment of the Court's traditional eighth amendment doctrine is
in apparent contradiction with the literal sense of the amend-
ment is doubtless significant but hardly dispositive. At most, it
succeeds in shifting the burden of proof to those who support
the traditional view to show why this particular departure from
the literal import of the amendment is justified. In Part III, I
take up this challenge.
95. See, e.g., Hollingworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798)
(holding that .congressional resolutions proposing federal constitutional
amendments need not be submitted to the President). See generally THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 127-28
(rev. ed. 1973).
96. Thus, despite the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws," the Court has consistently upheld laws that impact
persons unequally so long as those laws have a "reasonable basis" or serve
"important" or "compelling" government objectives. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1436-1672 (2d ed. 1988). Likewise, the
constitutional injunction against any state entering "into any Agreement or
Compact with another State" without congressional consent has been
construed not to apply to interstate agreements on such minor matters as
adjustments of boundaries. See, e.g., Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503
(1893). For further examples, see L. LEVY, supra note 80, at 336-38.
97. As legal historians have shown, the original Constitution and Bill of
Rights were framed and adopted by men committed to the common-law
interpretive canon that laws should not be interpreted literally, so as to defeat
the apparent intent of their makers, but "equitably" or "rationally" so as to
effect that intent and the outcome consistent with justice and right reason.
See, e.g., A. HAMILTON, THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 391 (J. Goebel, Jr. &J. Smith eds. 1964) ("In
law as in Religion the letter kills[,] the spirit makes alive"); J. WILSON, 2 THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 478 (R. McCloskey ed. '1967) ("Equity is
synonymous with true and sound construction"). See generally W. CROSSKEY, I
POLTICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 363-
74; Siege, The ,4ristotelian Basis of English Law, 1450-1800, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18
(1981); Blatt, The History of Statuoy Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance,
6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 802-08 (1987).
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B. Scalia's Majoritarian Argument
In Stanford, Justice Scalia offers a second reason for aban-
doning Part (3) of the traditional eighth amendment analysis:
that it is inconsistent with due judicial deference to the judg-
ments of electorally accountable officials. Scalia writes:
By reaching a decision supported neither by constitu-
tional text nor by the demonstrable current standards of
our citizens, the dissent displays a failure to appreciate
that "those institutions which the Constitution is sup-
posed to limit" include the Court itself. To say, as the
dissent says, that "it is for us ultimately to judge whether
the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death
penalty-and to mean that as the dissent means it, i.e.,
that it is for us to judge, not on the basis of what we per-
ceive the Eighth Amendment originally prohibited, or on
the basis of what we perceive the society through its dem-
ocratic processes now overwhelmingly disapproves, but
on the basis of what we think "proportionate" and "mea-
surably contributory to acceptable goals of punish-
ment"--to say and mean that, is to replace judges of the
law with a committee of philosopher-kings."8
Implicit in this quotation is a vision of constitutional adju-
dication that can only be described as contra-constitutional. It
is widely agreed that the Constitution, as it came from the
hands of its eighteenth-century framers, was in many respects a
deliberately antimajoritarian document.9 9 Responding to per-
ceived democratic excesses during and after the Revolutionary
War, the framers sought to dilute the impact of popular opin-
ion by creating an elaborate system of separated and enumer-
ated powers, indirect elections, and checks and balances among
the three branches of the national government. An essential
feature of this system was the establishment of an independent
judiciary, insulated from majoritarian pressures and empow-
ered, as Alexander Hamilton said, to
guard the constitution and the rights of individuals from
the effects of those ill humours which the arts of design-
ing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures,
sometimes disseminate among the people themselves,
98. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980.
99. Ser, e.g., G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 471-518 (1969); Hofstadter, The Founding Fathers: An Age of
Realism, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 62-74 (R.
Horwitz ed., 3d ed. 1986); Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism as a
Constitutional Philosophy, 71 IowA L. REv. 401, 468-79 (1986).
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and which.., have a tendency.., to occasion dangerous
innovations in government, and serious oppressions of
the minor party in the community.'0°
As Justice Brennan notes in his dissent in Stanford, "Justice
Scalia's approach would largely return the task of defining the
contours of the Eighth Amendment to political majorities."' 0'°
But "[t]he very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts."'0 2 If applied generally to the Constitution's "majestic
generalities'"" it would turn what was meant for bread into
stone and undermine the Court's historical role in our constitu-
tional system to "stand against any winds that blow as havens
for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless,
weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming vic-
tims of prejudice and public excitement. '"'04
The costs of generalizing Justice Scalia's majoritarian
argument are clearly considerable. Judgments about propor-
tionality do not differ significantly from many other types of
judgments judges are regularly required to make under current
constitutional doctrine. To cite a few of the better known
examples: Under currently accepted equal protection, free
speech, and free exercise standards, judges must decide
whether challenged governmental actions serve "important" or
"compelling" state interests.' 0 5 One strand of contemporary
free speech doctrine requires courts to "balance" competing
100. THE FEDERALUST No. 78, at 527 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
101. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2986-87.
102. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943).
103. Id. at 639.
104. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
105. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (intermediate
judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause requires that a challenged
state action be substantially related to an important government objective);
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (content-based restrictions on
political speech in a public forum are permissible only if they serve a
compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to achieve that end);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)
(laws or state practices substantially burdening free exercise of religion are
justifiable only if they serve a compelling state interest by means narrowly
tailored to that end); but see Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
1601 (1990) (religion-based exemptions to otherwise valid secular laws are
not required except when petitioner's free exercise claim also implicates
other constitutional protections).
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private and governmental interests-"' And long-recognized
due process principles require judges to determine whether
laws or governmental practices violate norms "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty"' 1 7 or trench on values "so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental."' 0 8 None of these various doctrines has any
better grounding in the original understanding or constitu-
tional text than does the principle of proportionality.' °0 None
has any firmer roots in the Court's prior decisions. None pro-
vides any more "objective" criteria for resolving issues falling
under them. Accordingly, Justice Scalia's majoritarian argu-
ment would seem to apply with equal force to each of these
principles. Yet few would be prepared to accept the sweeping
purge of established constitutional doctrine his argument
appears to imply.
In sum, Justice Scalia has not met the substantial burden of
proof rightly imposed on those who seek to overturn Supreme
Court precedents as old and as firmly established as is the
eighth amendment principle of proportionality. Additional
support for this conclusion can be garnered by examining argu-
ments that support the traditional eighth amendment analysis.
To that task we now turn.
III. A BRIEF DEFENSE OF THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
In his critique of eighth amendment proportionality analy-
sis, Justice Scalia asserts that the Court has "never invalidated a
punishment on this basis alone.' All of the cases condemn-
ing a punishment under this mode of analysis, he contends,
"also found that the objective indicators of state laws or jury
determinations evidenced a societal consensus against that
penalty."' Thus, according to Scalia, not only is Part (3) of
106. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)
(adopting balancing approach toward government regulations having merely
an incidental suppressive impact on speech or expressive conduct). See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 96, at 977-1010.
107. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937). See also
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
108. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S.
Ct. 2333, 2341 (1989) (plurality opinion).
109. See generally Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703, 710-13 (1975); L. LEVY, supra note 80, at 175-76, 195-220; R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMAION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 166-220 (1977).
110. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980.
111. Id
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the traditional eighth amendment test a dangerous invitation to
judicial freelancing; it is not even strictly needed to make sense
of the Court's prior eighth amendment decisions.
This is a bit disingenuous, since Scalia fails to mention that
the Court has repeatedly and explicitly stated that "the Eighth
Amendment concept of proportionality involves more than
merely a measurement of contemporary standards of decency.
It requires in addition that the penalty imposed in a capital case
be proportional to the harm caused and the defendant's blame-
worthiness.""' 2 Indeed, it is positively misleading, since a
number of High Court eighth amendment cases are expressly
premised on one or more prongs of Part (3) of the traditional
test."t3 But here I want to focus attention on one entire area of
eighth amendment case-law that makes no sense at all apart
from Part (3) principles, that of prisoners' rights law.
Prior to the 1960s, courts generally took a "hands off"
approach toward prisons, viewing prisoners as virtual slaves of
the state who had lost most of their rights upon conviction."1 4
Beginning in the mid-1960s, following the Court's decision in
Cooper v. Pete" 5 that inmates have the right to sue prison offi-
cials under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, lower
courts began to take a more "activist" stance toward prison
conditions and prisoners' rights. The resulting changes, both
in terms of prison conditions and prison-related adjudication,
have been dramatic. Whole prison systems have been funda-
mentally restructured under judicial supervision."16 Forty-
three states are currently under court orders because of prison
overcrowding or other abuses." 7 And inmate suits against
prison officials, once a mere trickle, have become a virtual
112. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 823 (1982). See also Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
113. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1977) (holding
that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prison inmate
violates eighth amendment ban on the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (striking down vague
capital punishment statute on grounds that it created a substantial risk that
the penalty would be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner).
114. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refisal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 508-09 (1963).
115. 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
116. See generally B. CROUCH & J. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE:
LITIGATED REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS (1989); L. YAcKLE, REFORM AND
REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA
PRISON SYSTEM (1989); COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONsrrrtmON: THE
IMPACT OFJUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON.PRISONS AND JAILS (J. Dilulio ed. 1990).
117. See Drug Cases Clog the Courts, 76 A.B.A.J. 34.34 (1990).
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flood." As a result, prisoners' rights jurisprudence is now
clearly the highest impact area of eighth amendment law.
Inmate eighth amendment suits against prison officials can
be grouped into two broad classes: systemic and non-systemic
suits. Systemic suits are typically class-action suits that chal-
lenge an entire system or pattern of punishment practices that
affect all inmates, or large groups of inmates, more or less
equally. An example is Hutto v. Finney,"" in which the Court
upheld challenged elements of a lower court ruling mandating
sweeping reforms in the Arkansas prison system. Non-systemic
suits, by contrast, challenge the treatment of individual inmates
who allegedly have been singled out for arbitrary, excessively
harsh, or inhumane punishment. Estelle v. Gamble,'2 ° in which
the Court held that deliberate indifference to the serious medi-
cal needs of the petitioner constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, exemplifies this second type of suit.
Virtually no one now advocates a return to the "hands off"
approach of earlier days with respect to non-systemic prison-
ers' rights suits. Judicial involvement in systemic suits naturally
tends to be more controversial, owing to legitimate concerns
about separation of powers and judicial competence to direct
far-reaching prison change.' 2 ' However, it is widely agreed
that court-ordered systemic prison reform is sometimes imper-
ative. Federal judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. describes one such
case:
A shocking example of a failure of state officials to
discharge their duty was forcefully presented in a lawsuit
tried before me in 1972, Newman v. Alabama, which chal-
lenged the constitutional sufficiency of medical care avail-
able to prisoners in the Alabama penal system. The
evidence in that case convincingly demonstrated that cor-
rectional officers on occasion intentionally denied
inmates the right to examination by a physician or to
treatment by trained medical personnel, and that they
118. See B. CROUCH &J. MARQUART, supra note 116, at I ("In 1966, for
example, 219 suits were filed by prisoners; by the late 1970s, nearly 10,000
were being filed annually").
119. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
120. 429 U.S. 97 (1977).
121. For generally critical assessments ofjudicial intervention in prison
affairs, see Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies,
30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978); Boatwright, Federal Courts and States Prison Reform:
A Formula for Large Scale Federal Intervention into State Affairs, 14 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 545 (1980); Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending
Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43 (1978).
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routinely withheld medicine and other treatments pre-
scribed by physicians. Further evidence showed that
untrained inmates served as ward attendants and X-ray,
laboratory, and dental technicians . . , and [that]
unsupervised inmates without formal training pulled
teeth, gave injections, sutured, and performed minor sur-
gery. In fact, death resulting from gross neglect and
totally inadequate treatment was not unusual.
... A quadriplegic with bedsores infested with mag-
gots was bathed and had his bandages changed only once
in the month before his death. An inmate who could not
eat received no nourishment for three days prior to his
death even though intravenous feeding had been ordered
by a doctor. A geriatric inmate who had suffered a stroke
was made to sit each day on a wooden bench so that he
would not soil his bed; he frequently fell onto the floor;
his legs became swollen from a lack of circulation, neces-
sitating the amputation of a leg the day before his
death.' 2
Better than any abstract argument could, such descriptions
demonstrate that any defensible eighth amendment test must
apply both to the sentencing decisions of courts and to the pun-
ishment practices of prison officials and jailers.
By this standard, Justice Scalia's two-part test of eighth
amendment claims is clearly inadequate. What we today would
consider morally intolerable treatment of prisoners was com-
monplace in the framers' generation and occasioned few if any
constitutional qualms.'12  Thus, the original intent prong of
Justice Scalia's test affords little meaningful protection for pris-
oners. More promising is Scalia's second test, which prohibits
punishments contrary to the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.I'24 But even this
test, as Scalia glosses it, is far from adequate.
As Justice Scalia construes it, the evolving standards test
prohibits punishments that society now "overwhelmingly dis-
approves,"' l2 5 as evidenced "in the operative acts (laws and
122. Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal Judge, 54 TEx. L. REv. 903,
907 (1976) (citations omitted). Cf. Hirschkop and Milleman, The
Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969); B. CROUCH & J.
MARQUART, supra note 116, at 16-29.
123. See generally Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal
Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1188-92 (1982).
124. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958)).
125. Id
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application of laws) that the people have approved."'12 1 Other
indicia that society now regards a particular form of punish-
ment as morally unacceptable-including public opinion
polls-are deemed too unreliable for purposes of judicial
review. 127 By this standard, of course, judicial intervention in
prison affairs is rarely justified, since elected officials and
prison administrators have consistently resisted efforts to rem-
edy scandalous conditions in America's prisons and jails. 2 1
Even if one adopted a less restrictive view of acceptable
indicia of current public attitudes toward the treatment of pris-
oners, the evolving standards test would still be incapable of
explaining or justifying most prison reform case-law. As Sher-
man and Hawkins note, the unfortunate truth is that
"[c]oncerning correctional conditions, Romilly's advice to Ben-
tham still applies: the public 'does not care tuppence' about
prison conditions.' 29 For this reason, relatively few lower
court prisoners' rights decisions make even the pretense of
examining "objective indicia" of current public attitudes
regarding the treatment and living conditions of inmates.
Instead, these decisions are typically bottomed quite explicitly
on considerations of proportionality 3 0 or other equally "sub-
jective" criteria, such as whether confinement conditions
126. Id at 2979. As many critics of the death penalty have pointed out,
jury sentencing decisions cannot be viewed as accurate barometers of societal
attitudes toward capital punishment, because "death qualification"
procedures ordinarily disqualify potential jurors opposed to the use of the
death penalty. See, e.g., Acker, Dual and Unusual: Competing Views of Death
Penalty Adjudication, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 123, 131 n.42 (1990); F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 67 (1986). This
is particularly relevant in the context of capital sentences for juveniles, since
"[elvery reasonably reliable public opinion poll ever conducted on the
question of the death penalty for juveniles has found that a majority of the
respondents oppose it." V. STREa, supra note 81, at 34.
127. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979.
128. See B. CROUCH &J. MARq.UART, supra note 116, at 4. See generally L.
YACKLE, supra note 116, at 108-67.
129. M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA:
CHOOSING THE FUTURE 125 (1981).
130. See, e.g., Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1983); Smith
v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1984); Baumann v. Arizona Dept. of
Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1985); Nottingham v. Peoria, 709 F.
Supp. 542, 546 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Cody v. Hilliard, 830 F.2d 912, 913 (8th Cir.
1987), cert. den'd, 485 U.S. 106 (1988); Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 324
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. den'd, 109 S. Ct. 2087 (1989). Cf. Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (holding that prison conditions "must not involve
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting punishment").
EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE
"shock the conscience"'' of the court or involve the "wanton
and unnecessary infliction of pain." '3
In short,Justice Scalia's suggested analysis of the cruel and
unusual punishments clause fails either to explain or to justify a
vast body of clearly justifiable eighth amendment case-law. Of
course, Scalia might argue that the whole line of prison reform
cases is misbegotten and that courts should now frankly and
explicitly return to the "hands off" approach of earlier days.
But that is a view which few in the legal community would sup-
port, and which, in fact, even the Court's most conservative
members have consistently opposed. 3 3 Alternatively, and per-
haps more likely, Scalia might argue for a two-track eighth
amendment analysis, one track applying to sentencing deci-
sions and one to conditions of confinement. However, it is dif-
ficult to imagine what principled basis Scalia might offer for
such a bifurcated analysis.' Certainly there is no basis in the
Court's eighth amendment case-law for any such two-track test.
And in law, as elsewhere, complexities should not be multiplied
without necessity.
131. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. Ark. 1970);
Bums v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. den'd, 404 U.S.
1062 (1972).
132. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 600 (7th Cir. 1986);
Hemphill v. Moore, 661 F. Supp. 1192, 1194 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Oft v. White,
813 F.2d 318, 322 (11th Cir. 1987); Reutcke v. Dahm, 707 F. Supp. 1121,
1134 (D. Neb. 1988). Cf. Whiteley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)
(reaffirming prior holding that the eighth amendment prohibits infliction of
unnecessary and wanton pain on prison inmates).
133. Even Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist, of whom it might
almost be said that he never met a harsh punishment he didn't like, joined
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981), applying the traditional eighth amendment analysis to prison
conditions. Justice White also joined Powell's opinion.
134. It might be suggested that such a principled basis lies in the value
of judicial deference to the representative branches. When a court strikes
down a sentencing decision it invalidates a penalty expressly authorized by
elected officials. By contrast, when a court intervenes in prison
administration it typically nullifies acts that have no express legislative
authorization. This difference is important enough, it might be argued, to
warrant the kind of two-track eighth amendment analysis at issue.
Notice, however, that this is not an argument Justice Scalia can accept.
His claim is that no punishment is barred by the eighth amendment unless it
is both cruel and unusual. But cruel and inhumane treatment of prisoners was
the norm prior to the demise of the "hands off" doctrine. Those who "set
their faces" against barbarous prison conditions were federal judges, not
elected officials. Thus, Justice Scalia's reading of the cruel and unusual
punishments clause is incapable of justifying this vital area of eighth
amendment law.
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I have focused, to this point, on prison reform adjudication
because it provides a clear and relatively uncontroversial
counterexample to the adequacy of Justice Scalia's eighth
amendment analysis. I have argued that judges should be free,
in reviewing prisoners' rights complaints under the eighth
amendment, to consider just the sorts of issues that Scalia's test
would exclude: (a) whether a punishment is grossly dispropor-
tionate to the gravity of a prisoner's offense, and (b) whether a
given punishment involves the wanton and purposeless inflic-
tion of suffering. That judges should likewise be free to con-
sider such issues in reviewing the constitutionality of
sentencing decisions has been powerfully argued by others"3 5
and thus can be discussed more briefly. For brevity, I limit con-
sideration to the principle of proportionality.
The notion that the eighth amendment prohibits grossly
excessive punishments was not the invention of wild-eyed judi-
cial liberals, bent on writing their own predilections into our
nation's fundamental law. The principle first appeared, almost
a century ago, in dissenting opinions by conservative Justices
Field, Brewer, and Harlan in O'Neil v. Vermont.' 6 At issue in
O'Neil was the constitutionality of a sentence of more than fifty-
four years' imprisonment at hard labor and a fine of over
$6,600 for the crime of selling intoxicants without a license.
The dissenters there found-as a majority of the Court would
later find in Weems -37-that the framers had intended the
eighth amendment to bar punishments greatly disproportioned
to the offenses charged. 13 8 As noted earlier, this historical con-
clusion was probably mistaken.. But as Weems and subsequent
cases have put beyond doubt, the amendment is not to be
viewed as "fastened to the obsolete.' 39 In particular, the prin-
ciple that a "punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense " 4 ° is now viewed as a constitu-
tional requirement regardless of the framers' intent.
135. See, e.g., Acker, supra note 126, at 142, 150-54; V. STREIB, supra
note 81, at 24-39; H. BEDAU, DEATH iS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALrrY,
LAw, AND PoLrTcs OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 92-128 (1987); Stanford, 109 S.
Ct. at 2982-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. 144 U.S. 323 (1892). The principle had earlier been explicitly or
implicitly affirmed in a number of state court decisions. See L. BERKSON, supra
note 11, at 68-70.
137. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 372-73.
138. See O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting); id at 371
(Harlan and Brewer, JJ., dissenting).
139. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
140. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE
O'Neil provides a striking illustration of why, for nearly
eight decades, liberal and conservative Justices alike have con-
sistently endorsed the principle of proportionality. The fact is
that sentencing judges and juries do sometimes impose outra-
geously excessive punishments on offenders,"'4 and it has been
thought intolerable that a charter of liberties that provides such
elaborate safeguards against wrongful conviction should afford
no meaningful protection against the arbitrary or inhumane
use of the state's coercive power once a verdict of guilt has
been pronounced.
It is true that Justice Scalia's narrowly construed evolving
standards test would provide protection against some of the
most egregious punishments, namely those against which soci-
ety as a whole has clearly set its face. But our nation's history is
replete with examples of barbarous and cruelly excessive penal-
ties that would pass muster under Scalia's purely conventional-
ist test. That test is thus less attractive than the traditional
analysis, which provides "insulation against our baser
selves,"'142 even when those baser selves enjoy temporary
ascendancy in our legislative assemblies and courts of law. It is
also deeply at odds with the fundamental normative vision
underlying the Constitution: the notion that individuals have
rights, rooted in an ineffaceable dignity or sacredness of per-
sons as such, which may not be violated no matter how power-
ful or numerous are those who would deny them. 43 In short,
141. See, e.g., Handy v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 406, 80 S.W. 526 (1904)
(thirty-year sentence for burglary of two jars of blackberries); Nowling v.
State, 151 Fla. 584, 10 So.2d 130 (1942) (three years' imprisonment for
concealing one gallon of whiskey); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d
374 (Ky. 1968) (life without possibility of parole for rape committed at age
fourteen); Rener v. Beto, 447 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971) (thirty-year sentence for
possession of one marijuana cigarette); Carter v. State, 500 S.W.2d 368 (Ark.
1973) (eight-year sentence for consensual homosexual sodomy); Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (life sentence with possibility of parole for three
minor non-violent felonies); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam)
(forty years' imprisonment and fine of $20,000 for possession of nine ounces
marijuana); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (life sentence without
possibility of parole for seven non-violent felonies); Naovarath v. State, 779
P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989) (life imprisonment without possibility of parole
imposed on 13-year-old for murdering his sexual abuser).
142. Furman, 408 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring).
143. See generally Hofstadter, supra note 99, at 62-74. Significantly, the
framers apparently did not believe that the written Constitution was the sole
source of binding fundamental law; basic human or natural rights were
considered judicially enforceable whether enumerated in the constitutional
text or not. See generally Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CuI.
L. REV. 1127 (1987); Grey, The Original Understanding and the Unwritten
Constitution, in TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: Six ESSAYS ON THE
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Justice Scalia's suggested reading of the eighth amendment is
consistent neither with the framers' underlying purposes nor
with the Court's prior decisions, nor can it be defended on
independent grounds of political morality. Accordingly, it
should be rejected.
IV. RETHINKING THOMPSON
Given the increasingly conservative drift of the Rehnquist
Court, there is little chance its holding in Stanford will soon be
reconsidered. Not so with Thompson, however. It is not unlikely
that conservatives on the Court will soon have both the votes
and the will'"4 to overrule Thompson outright. And the peculiar
4-1-3 split in the case, together with the narrow holding that
emerged from it,1 45 make it likely that the issue presented
there-namely, the constitutionality of executing a person who
was fifteen at the time of his or her crime-will again be before
the Court in the not-too-distant future. In this final section,
with an eye to that future case, I argue that the view taken by
the plurality in Thompson-that the eighth amendment categori-
cally prohibits such executions-is correct.
In the preceding two sections, I defended the Court's
traditional three-part eighth amendment analysis. Assuming
that defense to be sound, the precise question to be decided is
CONsTrrUtION 145-73 (N. York ed. 1988). Scalia's view that, with some
concessions to deeply entrenched precedent, judicially enforceable
constitutional rights are limited to those embodied in the original
constitution is thus itself contrary to the original understanding.
144. Thompson is one of many recent cases indicating that the new
conservative majority on the Court has scant respect for the principle of stare
deciis. See, e.g., Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601 (1990)
(dramatically narrowing the traditional view of when individuals are entitled
to religion-based exemptions from secular laws). justice Scalia has been
particularly forthright about this view of precedent. See South Carolina v.
Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (1989). Cf. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct.
3047, 3067-68 (1990) (urging the Court to abandon the rule laid down in
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), that the eighth amendment
prohibits mandatory capital punishment statutes).
145. In cases like Thompson in which there is no majority opinion, "the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members
who concurred in thejudgment on the narrowest ground." Gregg, 428 U.S. at
169 n. 15. Thus, what the Court held in Thompson is what Justice O'Connor
held: that a person fifteen or younger at the time of his or her offense may
not be executed under a death penalty statute that specifies no minimum age
below which it ceases to apply. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 858-59 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Since Thompson was decided, two death
sentences for fifteen-year-old offenders have been struck down under
Thompson's authority. See State v. Stone, 535 So.2d 362 (La. 1988); Cooper v.
State, 540 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989).
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whether that traditional analysis prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty on a person who was under sixteen years of age
at the time of his or her offense.
Part (1) of the traditional test, it will be recalled, proscribes
punishments that fall within the original understanding of the
cruel and unusual punishments clause.' 46 We noted earlier
that "the evidence is unusually clear and unequivocal" that
capital punishment for crimes committed at age fifteen or
younger was not originally believed to be barred by the
clause. 147 Thus, the first prong of the traditional analysis is
clearly satisfied in the present case.
A much tougher question is whether the execution of a fif-
teen-year-old offender is prohibited by the evolving standards
test. We saw earlier that this test has come to be closely linked
to two "objective indicia" of public attitudes toward a given
sanction: legislative enactments and the sentencing decisions
ofjuries. 48 The most recent statistics bearing on the question
indicate that: (1) the last execution in the United States for a
crime committed under the age of sixteen occurred in 1948;141
(2) over one recent five-year period, only five fifteen-year-olds
(and no offenders younger than fifteen) were sentenced to
death; 5 0 (3) fourteen states (including the District of Colum-
bia) currently do not authorize capital punishment at all;' 5' (4)
nineteen states authorize capital punishment and set no mini-
mum age at which the penalty may be imposed;'- 2 (5) eighteen
states authorize capital punishment but establish a minimum
age for its imposition ranging from sixteen to eighteen.' 3
These statistics are clearly subject to varying interpreta-
tions. Thus the dissent in Thompson, emphasizing the fact that
the death penalty could theoretically be imposed in nineteen
states as well as under federal law,"M found no basis for dis-
cerning "with the requisite degree of certainty, a constitutional
consensus in this society that no person can ever be executed
146. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
149. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832 (plurality opinion).
150. See V. STREs, supra note 81 at 168-69.
151. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826 (plurality opinion). Vermont is
frequently counted as a fifteenth state without a death penalty, since its
capital sentencing scheme fails to guide jury discretion as mandated by
Furman. See Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2983 n. I (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826-27.
153. See id at 829.
154. See id at 865-68.
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for a crime committed under the age of 16."' 5 The plurality,
preferring to spotlight the fact that every legislature that has
expressly set a minimum age for capital punishment has set
that age at sixteen or above,' 56 concluded that the requisite
degree of consensus does exist.' 57 Justice O'Connor, charac-
teristically, 5 1 urged a more cautious conclusion: that the evi-
dence supporting such a consensus, while strong, is not yet so
compelling that the Court would be justified in declaring a
blanket constitutional ban on the execution of any fifteen-year-
old offender.1
59
These disagreements underscore a familiar theme of
recent jurisprudence: that judgments about supposedly "neu-
tral" or "objective" sources of legal values (framers' intent,
conventional morality, "plain" textual meaning, etc.) often
prove to be no less contestable and value-laden than judgments
that attempt to grapple directly with the normative implications
of interpretive choices.' In this case, Justice O'Connor's
modest conclusion of "probable but not proven" appears to be
the one best supported by the available evidence.
We therefore turn to Part (3) of the traditional eighth
amendment analysis. As we have seen, this requires judges to
make an independent assessment whether a given sanction
constitutes grossly excessive punishment, makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable penological goals, or is authorized
under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk of
arbitrary and capricious outcomes. 6 1
Of these three tests, the second has long been the most
controversial. First articulated at a time when it was widely
believed both that retribution was not an acceptable penologi-
cal goal"6 2 and that capital punishment was not a significantly
155. Id. at 871-72.
156. See id. at 829.
157. See id. at 833.
158. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040,
3061 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (endorsing the traditional
principle that the Court should not formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than the precise facts to which it is applied).
159. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58.
160. See generally R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 63-69 (1980);
Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 683 (1985); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Intpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1498-1511 (1987).
161. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
162. See generally Furman, 408 U.S. at 342-45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Retribution is no
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better deterrent to crime than less extreme sanctions,163 the
measurable contribution principle was vigorously criticized
from its inception as invitirrg judicial policymaking in areas best
reserved for legislative judgment. 164 Today, now that each of
these once-popular beliefs is widely contested,"16 it may well be
wondered whether the measurable contribution principle has
any legitimate place in eighth amendment jurisprudence.
Such concerns, while valid, should not be overstated. We
have seen that the measurable contribution principle does play
a key role-acknowledged even by Court conservatives-in the
field of prisoners' rights adjudication. 1 Nevertheless, I agree
that the principle should play a limited role in evaluating the
constitutionality of sentencing decisions. In particular, courts
should not be quick to second-guess 'legislative judgments
about the comparative deterrent value of various punishments.
This is a point on which Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in
Thompson can rightly be faulted. Stevens concludes that the
execution of fifteen-year-old offenders does not measurably
contribute to the goal of deterrence. 6 7 However, he cites no
direct criminological evidence for this claim. Moreover, the
sorts of reasons he does cite (e.g., the small number ofjuvenile
executions in this century and the unlikelihood that many ado-
lescent offenders actually engage in the kind of cost-benefit
analysis the deterrence rationale presumes) tend to show, at
best, that fifteen-year-olds would not be significantly deterred by
such executions. But of course a legislature might reasonably
determine that a few highly publicized juvenile executions
would deter a number of older would-be offenders. And I can
longer the dominant objective of the criminal law"); Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (speaking approvingly of the "tardy and
unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retribution
and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution").
163. See generally Furifnan, 408 U.S. at 345-54 (Marshall, J., concurring).
See also id at 302 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
164. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 345-54 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
165. For defenses of more or less retributivist theories of punishment,
see Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968); J. MURPHY,
RETRIBUTION,JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 77-115 (1979); W. BERNS, supra n ote 10,
at 153-76; R. NozIcK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981); A. VON
HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE
SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31-60 (1985); I. PRIMORATZ. JUSTIFYING LEGAL
PUNISHMENT 111-69 (1989). For a much-controverted defense of the
deterrent efficacy of capital punishment, see Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
166. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
167. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837-38.
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see no reason why this should not be counted as an "accepta-
ble" penological goal.
A stronger challenge to the permissibility of executing fif-
teen-year-olds focuses on whether American jurisdictions cur-
rently employ capital sentencing procedures that ensure that
the death penalty for teenage offenders will not be imposed in
an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion. As the Court's prior
cases make clear, imposition of the ultimate penalty for crime is
intolerable if there is "no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not." 16 To pass constitutional muster, state-sanc-
tioned killing must not be "cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."' 69
By these standards, "[t]he imposition of the death penalty
on juveniles is a prime example of an arbitrary, capricious, and
freakish punishment."' 70 Department of Justice statistics indi-
cate that during one recent five-year period, 82,094 arrests
were made for willful criminal homicide. 17 1 Of these, only
1,393 were sentenced to death.'7 2 And of this number, only
five were younger than sixteen at the time of the offense.'
7 3
These five constituted a microscopic 0.3% of the 1,861 persons
arrested for willful homicide who were under the age of
sixteen. 1 7 4
Of course it might be urged that the freakish rarity with
which fifteen-year-old offenders are sentenced to death reflects
the carefully weighed judgment ofjuvenile judges, prosecutors,
and juries that the ultimate penalty should be reserved for
those handful of offenders whose crimes are peculiarly heinous.
The available evidence suggests, however, that this is not the
case. In the words of the nation's foremost authority on juve-
nile death sentences, "[n]o rational selection process can be
determined, and one is left to conclude that the basis of selec-
tion is arbitrary and capricious." 7s
168. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). See also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301 (1987); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486
U.S. 356, 362 (1988).
169. Furman. 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
170. Streib, Imposing the Death Penalty on Children, in CHALLENGING
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 251 (K. Haas
&J. Inciardi eds. 1988).
171. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832 (plurality opinion).
172. Id
173. Id. at 832-33.
174. Id at 833 n.39.
175. V. STREIB, supra note 81, at 39.
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Challenges based on the arbitrariness of juvenile capital
sentences were not put forward in any of the opinions in
Thompson or Stanford. Presumably this was because a majority of
the Court had recently held in McCleskey v. Kemp '76 that such
challenges could succeed only if it could be shown that a partic-
ular sentencing procedure fails to "focus discretion 'on the par-
ticularized nature of the crime and the particularized
characteristics of the individual defendant.' "'77 And in neither
Thompson nor Stanford was any such proof attempted.
However, as Justice Brennan demonstrates in his powerful
dissent in McCskey, this holding was a wholly unwarrantable
departure from controlling precedent.17 8  Earlier cases had
made clear that it is not enough merely that sentencing discre-
tion be "focused" on particularized considerations. 7 9 Guided
discretion is not an end in itself, but is directed toward a fur-
ther end-that of insuring that a sanction "unique in its sever-
ity and irrevocability"' 8 0 will not be imposed in an arbitrary or
discriminatory fashion. The crucial question, then, as the
Court's prior cases had recognized, is whether a given sentenc-
ing scheme creates a substantial risk that capital sentencing deci-
sions will be significantly influenced by impermissible
considerations. I8
It is no answer to this anti-arbitrariness argument to point
out, as the conservative majority did in McCleskey, m8 2 that it
would open the gates to a flood of eighth amendment chal-
lenges based on any number of arbitrary variables, such as
race, sex, or personal attractiveness, which have been-shown to
influence capital sentencing decisions. That, as Justice Bren-
nan aptly retorted in dissent, is merely "to suggest a fear of too
176. 48i U.S. at 279.
177. Id. at 308.
178. Id. at 322-24 (BrennanJ., dissenting).
179. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (invalidating state statute requiring sentencers to consider whether
an offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman," on
grounds it created an unacceptable risk that the penalty would be meted out
in an arbitrary and capricious manner); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356,
362-64 (1988) (invoking Godfrey to strike down capital punishment provision
requiring sentencers to decide whether an offense was "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel").
180. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (opinion of Stewart, Stevens, and Powell,
Vi.).
181. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 999 (1988); California
v. Brown. 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427
(1980) (plurality opinion).
182. See McCIeske, 481 U.S. at 314-19.
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much justice."'t8 3 The Court should now forthrightly acknowl-
edge that the experiment begun a decade and a half ago in
Gregg has failed. The underlying assumption of Gregg was that
guided discretion schemes would reduce to morally tolerable
limits the extent to which capital sentencing decisions are
determined by arbitrary or discriminatory factors, such as race,
class, or sex. That assumption, as study after study has
shown,' is unfounded. Today, no more than in 1972, does
the Constitution tolerate "the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this penalty to be so wantonly
and freakishly imposed.'""
Finally, under the traditional analysis we must determine
whether the execution of a person for a crime committed at age
fifteen or younger is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of
the offense committed.
In assessing the "gravity" of an offense for purposes of
proportionality analysis, the Court has traditionally considered
both the seriousness of the harm inflicted and the degree of the
offender's culpability. 8 6 For our purposes, the critical ques-
tion is whether a person under sixteen years of age is capable
of acting with the degree of culpability that can warrant the
ultimate punishment.
In addressing this question, the views of respected profes-
sional organizations with special expertise are clearly relevant.
Strikingly, one finds a strong consensus among such organiza-
tions that the death penalty even for sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds is morally unacceptable.'8 7 Striking, also, is the fact
that capital punishment for juveniles has in practice been abol-
ished throughout the developed world. Worldwide, according
to Amnesty International statistics, only eight juvenile execu-
tions have taken place since 1979.188 Three of those occurred
183. Id at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. See generally S. GROSS & R. MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL DISPARTIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); B. NAKELL & K. HARDY,
THE ARBrrRARINESS OF THE DATH PENALTY (1987); D. BALous, G.
WooDwoRTH & C. PULASKI, EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990).
185. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
186. See, e.g., Solemn v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598
(1976).
187. These organizations include, atnong others, the American Bar
Association, the American Law Institute, the National Council ofJuvenile and
Family Court Justices, and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
See Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. Id
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in the United States. The other five were carried out in Bangla-
189desh, Rwanda, Pakistan, and Barbados. .In this country, there has long been broad agreement on
the proposition that less culpability should ordinarily attach to
a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime
committed by an adult. This is reflected in a wide range of leg-
islative enactments bottomed on the recognition that " 'minors
often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment' expected
of adults."'" Thus, all states impose special disabilities on
juveniles with respect to voting, jury service, marriage, opera-
tion of a motor vehicle, and many other activities or engage-
ments believed to require a level of maturation and
responsibility juveniles typically lack.' Moreover, all states
have established a juvenile justice system premised on the
assumption that most young offenders should not be held
to the same standards of accountability as their adult
counterparts. 192
These popularly-held beliefs about the limited capacities
of juveniles for informed, responsible decision-making are
reinforced by an impressive body of socioscientific evidence.
That evidence reveals adolescents to be "more vulnerable,
more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults;"'9g less
able "to control their conduct and to think in long-range
terms;' 94 more impressionable and subject to peer pres-
sure; 195 more prone to risk-taking, bravado, and a false sense of
their own "omnipotence and immortality;" '96 and less able to
grasp and employ moral concepts and patterns of reasoning
characteristically featured in adult ethical decision-making.
In addition, there is substantial evidence that adolescents
sentenced to death typically suffer from "a battery of psycho-
189. Id.
190. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) (quoting Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)).
191. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 323-24.
102. Id. at 824.
193. F. ZIMRING, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
SENTENCING POUCY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME
7 (1978).
194. Id.
195. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 104, 115; Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2989
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. Miller, Adolescent Suicide: Etiology and Treatment, in 9 ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 327, 329 (S. Feinstein, J. Loomey, A. Schwartzberg, & A.
Sorotsky eds. 1981).
197. See Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a
Moral Order, 6 VrrA HUMANA 11, 30 (1963).
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logical, emotional, and other problems"'9 8 widely recognized
to diminish an agent's capacity for responsible choice. In one
recent study, for example, all fourteen adolescent death-row
inmates studied were found to suffer from serious psychiatric
disorders, ranging from psychosis to severe paranoia. Nine
were diagnosed as suffering from neurological disorders. Only
two had IQ scores above ninety. And all but two had been
physically or sexually abused or both."°
Taken together, the foregoing considerations strongly
support the proposition that death is an excessively harsh pun-
ishment for fifteen-year-old offenders. They probably do not
prove, however, that "all fifteen-year-olds are incapable of the
moral culpability that would justify the imposition of capital
punishment." 2" And that, according to Justice O'Connor, is
what must be shown if the proportionality argument is to
succeed.
This contention runs counter to some of the deepest cur-
rents of the American legal tradition and the Court's capital
punishment jurisprudence. One of the bedrock principles of
our legal system is that the awesome punitive powers of the
state must be hedged about with safeguards against their
abuse. Thus, we invest those brought to the bar of criminal
justice with a presumption of innocence 2 0' and require their
accusers to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused. °2 Likewise, we shield the accused with rights to be
judged by their peers, 203 to have the effective assistance of
counsel, 2 4 and to be tried in accordance with fundamentally
fair procedures.20° These familiar features of our acquittal-
prone system of criminal justice are thought essential both to
guard against the risk of individual injustice and to "command
the respect and confidence of the community in ... the moral
force of the criminal law."' 2°6 These same considerations apply
with equal force when the state stands, not in the role of
198. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2990 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. See Lewis, Pincus, Bard, Richardson, Prichep, Feldman, & Yeager,
Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family Characterstics of 14 Juveniles
Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584 (1988).
200. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 853 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis added).
201. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
202. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
203. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
204. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
205. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
206. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 358, 364.
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accuser, but that of final judge of life and death. As the Court
has recognized, our constitutional aspirations impose a "high
requirement of reliability on the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a particular case."120 7 In cases
where the defendant is fifteen or younger, the risk of an unwar-
ranted sentence of death is so high that no sentencer should be
entrusted with such awesome responsibility.
In conclusion, the Court's emerging eighth amendment
jurisprudence in general, and its jurisprudence of juvenile
death in particular, should be rethought. That jurisprudence,
we have seen, has no adequate basis in the constitutional text
or original understanding. It repudiates, for no sufficient rea-
son, longstanding principles of eighth amendment analysis. It
renders incoherent a substantial and clearly defensible body of
eighth amendment law. Finally, it threatens to introduce into
constitutional adjudication generally a principle of deference to
majority will and purely conventional values which may eventu-
ally undermine the Court's vital capacity "to appeal to men's
better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have
been lost in the moment's hue and cry."-20 ' For all of these
reasons, the emerging eighth amendment jurisprudence should
be rejected.
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